The Twenty-First Century Juror - the Worst of Times or the Best of Times by Hans, Valerie
American University Criminal Law Brief 
Volume 1 Issue 1 Article 4 
October 2011 
The Twenty-First Century Juror - the Worst of Times or the Best of 
Times 
Valerie Hans 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clb 
Recommended Citation 
Hans, Valerie (2011) "The Twenty-First Century Juror - the Worst of Times or the Best of Times," American 
University Criminal Law Brief: Vol. 1 : Iss. 1 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clb/vol1/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews 
at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
American University Criminal Law Brief by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ American University 
Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu. 
Criminal Law Brief 3 
 
 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY JURY:  
WORST OF TIMES OR BEST OF TIMES? 
Valerie P. Hans* 
 
I am pleased to be invited to reflect on the 
contemporary American jury for this issue of the Criminal 
Law Brief. In thinking about legal developments, new research 
findings, and the continuing swirl of controversy over this 
venerable American institution, I observe the same 
paradoxical condition that Charles Dickens found in 18th 
Century London: “It was the best of times; it was the worst of 
times.” There is evidence of both the expansion of jury trial 
rights, yet contraction of jury trials. Research evidence 
indicates that juries perform well, yet the 21st Century jury 
confronts more complex decision making tasks and continuing 
doubts about its fairness and competence.1  
 
Table 1: Total criminal jury and bench trials in 23 states, 1976–2002.a 
 
Table 2: Felony trial rates (per 1,000 dispositions) for 13 states, 1976–2002.b 
Table 3: Federal and State Court Filings and 
Jury Trials, 1999.c Is it the Worst of Times for the Criminal Jury? 
Our starting point is the rapidly declining use of the 
criminal jury. Centuries ago, trial by jury was the primary 
method of resolving criminal charges; but it has been on a 
downward slide for some time, with judges and especially 
prosecutors taking over more and more of the jury’s function.2 
Juries waned as the legal system became increasingly 
professionalized. Over the last few decades, a number of 
factors have conspired to 
reduce jury trial rates even 
further. One, of course, is 
the increasing cost of a trial. 
The introduction of 
sentencing guidelines and 
mandatory minimum 
sentences constitutes another 
important factor. Guidelines 
and mandatory minimum 
sentences make the gamble 
of a jury trial less attractive 
to defendants and 
consequently bolster the 
power of prosecutors to 
settle cases through plea 
agreements.  
More recent figures 
show that the jury trial rate 
has plummeted. Researchers 
at the National Center for 
State Courts examined the 
prevalence of jury trials in state courts from 1976 to 2002.3  
(See table below).  They found that although criminal filings 
skyrocketed during this time period, the absolute number of 
criminal jury trials decreased by 15%.4   
The jury 
trial rate, as a 
result, dropped 
substantially. In 
1976, for instance, 
there were 52 jury 
trials per 1,000 
felony case 
dispositions. By 
2002, the felony 
jury trial rate was 
just 22 per 1,000 
cases.5   
Federal District 
Courts 









Civil 260,271 4,000  7,171,842 33,125
Criminal  59,923 3,268  4,924,710 54,625
Total 320,194 7,268 12,096,552 87,750
A decline in the proportion of cases resolved by jury 
is also apparent in federal trial courts, where juries now 
resolve fewer than 5% of criminal dispositions.6 Indeed, one 
might argue rather convincingly that the criminal jury is 
becoming so rare that it will fade into oblivion before much of 
the 21st Century is gone.   
Jury trials are 
fewer and they appear to 
include more 
challenging evidence for 
juries to evaluate. In the 
mid-1950s, when 
Kalven and Zeisel 
began their famous 
national study of jury 
trials, the majority 
(72%) of the criminal 
jury trials that they 
studied included no 
expert witnesses.7 Trial 
judges are more likely 
to rate today’s criminal 
jury trials as complex.8 
Today, it is also more 
common for the 
attorneys to offer 
experts at trial. These 
experts might include 
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Pretrial Publicity and Its Influence on Juror Decision 
Making.e 
 
• A study conducted in 1995 found that roughly one-fourth 
of all suspects in crimes covered by newspaper articles 
may be subject to prejudicial pretrial publicity. 
• Jurors who have heard about prior bad acts by a party or 
who have reason to question the character of a party are 
more likely to convict of find fault with that party. 
Expert Witnesses.d 
 
Neither Side  72% 
Defense Only  3% 
Both Sides    3% 
Prosecution Only  22% 
----------------------------------------------- 
Total   100% 
 
Total Defense:   6% 
Total Prosecution:  25% 
medical examiners, doctors, psychologists, firearms and 
ballistic specialists, or DNA analysts. In a recent study of state 
criminal jury trials, 56% of the trials included at least one 
expert witness, most 
typically for the 
prosecution. Prosecutors 
called experts in just 
over half of the trials, 
while the defense 
employed experts in just 
one out of 
approximately every ten 
trials.9 Thus criminal juries must regularly evaluate expert 
testimony as they decide guilt and innocence. Even 
considering the larger gate-keeping role of judges under the 
Daubert standard, some research studies raise doubts about 
whether juries fully understand complicated scientific 
evidence such as DNA that purportedly links a defendant to a 
crime or medical testimony that addresses the defendant’s 
culpability.10
 Whether jury trials include more legally complex 
matters is an open question. Certainly, the legal instructions in 
capital jury trials have become formidable. The empirical 
work on how juries interpret and apply these instructions is 
not reassuring.11  Research shows that revising judicial 
instructions in line with cognitive and linguistic knowledge 
can readily improve comprehension, but with some 
exceptions, jurisdictions have been slow to revise their 
criminal jury instructions.12
 Jury trials have declined, yet public exposure to jury 
trials through the media remains substantial. Pretrial publicity 
has always been a problematic issue in high profile trials, but 
in today’s high visibility trials it is at another order of 
magnitude. In addition to CourtTV’s gavel-to-gavel coverage 
of jury trials nationwide, the media coverage of sensational 
trials like those of pop icon Michael Jackson and business and 
corporate executives such as Martha Stewart present major 
challenges for judges and worries about potential bias for 
attorneys. 
 Take the case of Scott Peterson, the California man 
accused of killing his pregnant wife Laci Peterson on 
Christmas Eve 2003 and dumping her body in the bay. News 
coverage of the police search, the discovery of Laci Peterson’s 
decomposed body and that of her unborn child in the bay, 
police reports identifying Scott Peterson as a suspect, and 
nonstop news reports of Scott Peterson’s affairs, arrest, and 
evidence against him surely skewed the jury pool.13 Once the 
trial began, the saturation media coverage influenced the 
jury’s composition and, some argued, even its decision to 
sentence Scott Peterson to death.14 Research on the multiple 
effects of pretrial publicity on jury decision making finds that 
such publicity negatively affects jurors’ initial impressions of 
the defendant, their evaluation of trial evidence, and the 
impact of prosecution versus defense arguments in the jury 
room.15 These negative effects underscore the need to 
vigorously manage high profile criminal jury trials.16
New studies have also confirmed that despite 
substantial reforms in the jury selection process, jury service 
remains unequally distributed. Primarily because of a 
differential response to jury summons, the young, the poor, 
and racial and ethnic minorities continue to be 
underrepresented in many jury pools.17  
Another problem is the enduring significance of race 
in jury selection. Because of substantial progress in jury 
summoning methods, American jury pools are much more 
diverse today than in previous times.18 Furthermore, a line of 
Supreme Court decisions has been aimed at eradicating the 
adversaries’ reliance on prospective jurors’ race and ethnicity 
in their exercise of peremptory challenges.19 Beginning with 
Batson v. Kentucky20 in 1986 through the Miller-El v. Dretke21 
case in 2005, the Court continues to insist that peremptory 
challenges be free of racial considerations. Yet recent studies 
of prosecutor and defense peremptory challenges show that 
the juror’s race and ethnicity continues to play a role.22 
Prosecutors are much more likely to challenge African-
Americans, while defense attorneys are more apt to challenge 
Caucasians. Evidence of the persistent effect of race in 
peremptory challenges has led to demands that peremptory 
challenges be reduced drastically or eliminated altogether.23  
 
Or Is It the Best of Times? 
 
Yes, it is a gloomy picture, but consider these 
developments. The United States Supreme Court surprised 
legal commentators with an important series of decisions that 
strongly reaffirmed the right to a jury trial. The Court, in 
Apprendi v. New Jersey,24 held that a defendant’s jury trial 
right extends to any contested sentencing-related fact that has 
to be proven in order for a judge to impose a sentence above 
the statutory maximum sentence that would otherwise apply. 
 A subsequent decision in Blakely v. Washington25 stated that 
the Apprendi rule governs even when the contested fact can be 
used to increase the sentence above an otherwise applicable 
sentencing guidelines-imposed maximum sentence.  Thus, the 
Court extended the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial to 
any fact determination that is required to increase the sentence 
above the maximum sentence that otherwise would be 
available under a guidelines system. 26 In United States v. 
Booker, however, the Court declined to make jury fact-finding 
in sentencing mandatory in the federal context; instead, it 
made the federal sentencing guidelines advisory rather than 
binding, rendering the Apprendi rule inapplicable.27  
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[T]he right to a jury trial 
in criminal cases as a 
constitutional matter is 
secure, and recent 
Supreme Court decisions 
have expanded its scope. 
The end result is that the jury is now destined to 
become a major player in the sentencing process in state—
although perhaps not federal—courts. Since most criminal 
jury trials occur in state rather than federal court, we will see 
state courts and state legislatures experimenting with ways to 
present disputed sentencing facts to the jury.28 Some 
commentators argue that jury sentencing will be more 
democratic,29 while others express concern that juries will not 
be up to the task.30 A new analysis of criminal trials and 
sentences just before and after the Apprendi decision finds that 
providing defendants the right to have sentencing facts 
determined by juries benefits criminal 
offenders.31 Interestingly, the current Supreme 
Court docket includes cases that examine the 
scope of the Confrontation Clause as well as 
cases that explore the propriety of withholding 
evidence from the jury, underscoring the 
significance the Court appears to be attaching to 
fact-finding in the adversary jury trial.32  
I am optimistic that if courts and 
legislatures properly structure the task of 
sentencing, juries can perform competently. 
Empirical studies are reassuring about the basic 
soundness of jury decision making. Systematic studies have 
repeatedly shown that the strength of the evidence presented at 
trial is the major determinant of jury verdicts.33 When the 
evidence is strong for conviction, the jury (and judge) 
convicts, and when it is moderate to weak, the jury (and judge) 
acquits.34 In research projects surveying judges, attorneys, and 
jurors who participated in criminal trials, judges are found to 
agree with the vast majority of jury verdicts, seeing them as 
based on the trial evidence rather than the jury’s biases and 
prejudices.35 Indeed, the jury’s verdict overlaps with the 
verdict the judge would have reached in most cases. 
But what about the greater complexity of 
contemporary trials? Kalven and Zeisel dealt with the 
evidence complexity question by assessing the agreement rate 
between the jury verdict and the judge’s hypothetical verdict 
in easy and complex cases.36 They found that juries and judges 
agreed just the same in easy and complex cases, suggesting 
that evidence complexity was not a major cause of judge-jury 
disagreement. The National Center for State Courts study of 
cases from 2000-2001 found similarly that judicial agreement 
with jury verdicts did not vary as a function of either 
evidentiary or legal complexity.37 The NCSC project also 
found, however, that, compared to jurors in cases in which all 
of the criminal charges were resolved by verdicts, jurors in 
cases that hung on one or more charges were more likely to 
describe their cases as complex.38 Hung jurors reported that 
their juries had more difficulty understanding the evidence, 
expert testimony, and the law in the case.39 Case complexity 
may not lead criminal juries to reach a different verdict from 
the judge, but it appears to make it more difficult to arrive at a 
verdict. 
Jury trial reforms can remedy some of the problems 
jurors face in complicated trials.40 Over the last two decades, a 
widespread movement for jury reform has swept through 
American courts. Many states have formed commissions to 
examine their jury selection and trial procedures, to review 
relevant studies, and to propose legal and procedural 
changes.41 Substantial research on trial reforms has already 
been conducted and more is underway.42 The American Bar 
Association drew on this body of work in revising its 
Principles for Juries and Jury Trials, which were adopted as 
ABA policy in February of 2005.43 For 
example, the commentary 
accompanying the Principles describes 
empirical work supporting a return to 
12-person unanimous juries, showing 
that larger juries that must deliberate to 
a unanimous verdict are more 
representative of the community and 
more accurate in decision-making.44 
Similarly, the principles that jurors be 
permitted to take notes, ask questions of 
witnesses, and employ jury notebooks 
are supported by research studies showing the benefits of these 
techniques.45
One project compared the value of different jury trial 
reforms for complex evidence comprehension.46 Mock juries, 
composed of members of a state court jury pool, watched a 
one-hour videotape of a trial that included dueling expert 
testimony about mitochondrial DNA evidence.47 Some mock 
juries solely watched the videotape and then deliberated to a 
verdict, while other groups were able to take notes, ask 
questions of experts, refer to jury notebooks, employ a 
checklist, or take advantage of multiple techniques.48 The 
mock jurors overall showed relatively good comprehension of 
the complex scientific evidence. Furthermore, certain analyses 
showed improvement for jurors who were given jury 
notebooks or checklists.49 However, even these reforms had 
modest impact, leading the authors to suggest that jury 
tutorials and court-appointed experts should be assessed for 
their use in complex trials.50  
Despite the potential of these reforms for improving 
jury comprehension in criminal trials, commentators have 
expressed some concerns about particular techniques, 
especially permitting jurors to ask questions of witnesses. Jury 
questions have the potential to move the jury away from the 
strict passivity of the decision maker in the adversary system, 
to a more active participant.51 Although there is no empirical 
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evidence that an active jury is more likely to prejudge the 
case, we should be mindful of that possibility as we propose 




Despite a drop in the proportion of criminal cases that 
are resolved by juries, the right to a jury trial in criminal cases 
as a constitutional matter is secure, and recent Supreme Court 
decisions have expanded its scope. What is more, in recent 
years, a number of other countries have adopted the jury or 
another form of lay participation into their legal systems.52 
Russia did so after the breakup of the Soviet Union and Spain 
incorporated the jury into its justice system following the 
dictatorial Franco regime.53 Other countries such as Japan, 
Korea, and Argentina have debated or have incorporated lay 
participation into their legal systems.54 These international 
developments suggest that even though incorporating lay 
citizens into the justice system can create some problems, it is 
seen as a valued method of promoting legitimacy and 
democracy.  
On balance, weighing these multiple and competing 
developments, I cannot conclude that these are either the best 
or the worst of times for the jury system. For those of us who 
study the American criminal jury, however, these certainly 
qualify as interesting times! 
 
* Valerie Hans, a nationally recognized preeminent jury 
expert has conducted numerous empirical studies relating to 
citizen participation in the law.  She is one of the leading 
national experts on the jury system.  Her writing has focused 
on such topics as the juvenile death penalty, racial and gender 
discrimination, the litigation explosion, corporate 
responsibility, the insanity defense, and media impact.  Her 
books include Business on Trial: The Civil Jury and Corporate 
Responsibility (2000); The Jury System: Contemporary 
Scholarship (2006, forthcoming) and Judging the Jury (1986, 
coauthored with Neil Vidmar). 
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